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PARTICIPATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: THE
MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE AFTER Presley v. Etowah
County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
Nancy C. Zaragoza
Abstract: Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires governing entities implementing
any new practices "with respect to voting" to first permit such changes to be scrutinized
for discriminatory effects. In Presley v. Etowah County Commission, the United States
Supreme Court held that a county government's restructuring of power among commis-
sioners did not require scrutiny because the restructuring did not constitute a change with
respect to voting. This Note examines Presley and concludes that the Court's decision
ignored precedent, created an unreasonable test and misapplied the test. To ensure effec-
tive enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the Court should adopt a two-pronged inquiry
that considers discriminatory motive as a factor. Given the Court's reluctance to give the
Act its intended broad meaning, Congress should amend the statute to include a broader
definition of voting practices.
In Russell County, Alabama, the County Commission controls the
funding of road repair and maintenance.' Traditionally, each elected
commissioner represented a residency district and had individual con-
trol over spending within a district. 2 Between 1972 and 1985, federal
court orders and consent decrees enlarged the commission in an
attempt to eliminate potential discrimination against minority voters.3
Anticipating the possible election of blacks to the commission, the
existing commissioners passed a resolution delegating much of the
road operation authority to a county engineer under a plan called the
"Unit System."4 In 1986, Russell County elected its first black com-
missioners.5 Once these new commissioners discovered that the new
Unit System had stripped away most of the power of individual com-
missioners, they brought suit under the Voting Rights Act ("Act")
6
alleging that the Unit System required preclearance.7 Preclearance
involves federal scrutiny of changes in practices "with respect to vot-
ing" to determine whether the changes have discriminatory effects.
Thus, whenever a governing entity implements any new changes
affecting voting, the entity must submit the changes for preclearance.8
The suit by the Russell county comissioners was joined by a newly
1. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 826 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 826-27.
4. Id. at 826.
5. Id. at 827.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (1988).
7. See Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 827.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
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elected black commissioner in Etowah County, Alabama, where that
commission passed a "Common Fund Resolution," stripping the
power of individual commissioners to control road operations and
funding within their districts.9 In Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
sion,1 o the Supreme Court held that the challenged resolutions did not
fall within the scope of the Voting Rights Act because they did not
constitute practices "with respect to voting."11
Contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Presley, this Note
argues that abolition of an elected official's decision-making authority
constitutes a change in voting practices requiring preclearance under
the Voting Rights Act. Part I examines the preclearance mechanism,
and illustrates its importance as the primary means of furthering the
Act's objectives. Part II critically analyzes the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Presley on three grounds. First, the Court ignored precedent
and adopted a category-based definition of voting practices. Second,
this new approach created a narrow, inflexible test that disregards the
potentially discriminatory effects of the practices at issue. Finally, the
Court misapplied its new test by holding that the Unit System and
Common Fund Resolution did not abolish an elective office. Part III
concludes that an inquiry into whether the practice was implemented
with discriminatory motives would better serve the objectives of the
Voting Rights Act. Additionally, Congress should amend the statute
to clarify the scope of section 5.
I. PRECLEARANCE UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
A. Preserving the Right to Vote
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "the right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude."12 Prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act, however,
black voters faced pervasive discrimination, especially in certain parts
of the country.13 Resistors to black enfranchisement devised a myriad
of discriminatory schemes to prevent black voters from reaching the
9. The Common Fund Resolution abolished individual commissioners' decision-making
authority and provided for collective decision-making by the commission as a whole. Presley,
112 S. Ct. at 825-26.
10. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
11. Id. at 832.
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.





voting booth, 4 such as poll taxes15 and literacy tests.16 Thus, in the
late 1950's and early 1960's, Congress sought ways to effectuate the
guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Congress' first attempts, however, proved unsuccessful. Although
Congress passed a series of civil rights acts prohibiting interference
with the right to vote in federal elections,17 case-by-case litigation
under these provisions proved inefficient 8 and ineffective. 9 Despite
these early legislative efforts, discrimination against minority voters
persisted, reflected by low voter registration and turnout,2' and by the
low number of minority-elected officials.21
14. Mississippi formed a constitutional convention to devise ways to legally circumvent the
Fifteenth Amendment. See Laughlin MacDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965: The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1983). A
delegate of the convention remarked, "It is regrettable that all the suggestions ... were not
recorded; had they been preserved, the record would be a monument to the resourcefulness of the
human mind." United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 987 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (Brown, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
15. Poll taxes were levied upon persons as a precondition to voting. These taxes restricted the
poor vote and the black vote by using wealth as a measure of voter qualification. Armand
Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REv. 523, 567 (1973).
16. Southern registrars tested potential voters for their ability to read and write. These tests
effectively restricted the black vote because they were unfairly administered to black applicants.
For example, a registrar once tested black applicants on the number of bubbles in a bar of soap,
the news in the PEKING DAILY, obscure state constitution provisions and legal terms such as
habeas corpus. ABIGAIL M. THERNsEROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT 15 (1987).
17. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1988)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1988))(restricting literacy tests to written tests and allowing completion of the sixth
grade to carry a presumption of literacy); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat.
86 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971e (1988)) (permitting a court to determine whether voting
discrimination occurred pursuant to a pattern or practice).
18. Assessing enforcement under these Civil Rights Acts' provisions, Congress concluded
that
[p]rogress has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of state and local
officials and repeated delays in the judicial process. Judicial relief has had to be gaged not in
terms of months-but in terms of years. With reference to the 71 voting rights cases filed to
date by the Department of Justice under the 1957, 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts, the
Attorney General testified before a judiciary subcommittee that an incredible amount of
time has had to be devoted to analyzing voting record--often as much as 6,000 man-
hours-in addition to time spent on trial preparation and the almost inevitable appeal.
H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441.
19. See id. ("[Tihe judicial process affords those who are determined to resist plentiful
opportunity to resist. Indeed, even after apparent defeat resisters seek new ways and means of
discriminating. Barring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result, only in
methods.").
20. For example, in Alabama the number of registered black voters increased only by 5.2%
between 1958 and 1964; in Mississippi only 6.4% of eligible blacks were registered in 1964
compared to 4.4% in 1954, and in Louisiana black voter registration barely increased from
31.7% in 1956 to 31.8% in 1965, whereas 80.2% of white voters were registered. Id.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1982).
1025
Washington Law Review Vol. 67:1023, 1992
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in realization that
existing civil rights legislation afforded minority voters virtually no
protection.22 The Voting Rights Act prohibited the use of tests and
devices, 3 authorized appointment of federal examiners,2" eliminated
the poll tax, 25 and required federal preclearance of any voting changes
in the jurisdictions covered by the Act.2 6 Through this "uncommon
exercise of congressional power,"' 7 Congress sought to effectuate the
Fourteenth28 and Fifteenth2 9 Amendments and protect minorities'
right to vote.3" Although considered one of the most radical pieces of
civil rights legislation,31 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Act, finding it solidly grounded in section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 2
22. Shortly before passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress passed the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. These provisions, however, never actually had a chance to go into effect. In the
summer of 1965, following the tragic police assault on civil rights activists in Selma, Alabama,
President Johnson urged swift implementation of the Voting Rights Act, which superseded the
voting rights provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See MacDonald, supra note 14, at 25-26.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1988).
24. Id § 1973d.
25. Id § 1973h.
26. Id § 1973c. The Act's "special provisions" of § 4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)
(1988))(specifying jurisdictions subject to special provisions), § 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1988))(authorizing preclearance of changes in voting practices), § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973d, f (1988)) (providing for federal examiners) and § 203 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b,
1973a-la (1988)) (providing for bilingual elections) were drafted as temporary provisions
originally in effect for only five years. The amendments have repeatedly extended the coverage
period: first in 1970 from five to ten years, Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-285, 84 Stat. 314, then in 1975 to seventeen years, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975), and
finally in 1982 for another nineteen years, Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
27. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
28. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against explicitly
racial voting discrimination. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Deriner, supra note 15, at 569-76 for a discussion of the
Fourteenth Amendment and voting discrimination.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
30. H.R. RP. No. 439, supra note 13.
31. LAWRENCE H. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336 (1978).
32. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-26 (1966). The Fifteenth Amendment
provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
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B. The Preclearance Process
The Voting Rights Act authorizes federal supervision of state and
local electoral practices.33 Section 5, the core of the Act, prohibits a
state or political subdivision from imposing any "voting qualification
or... practice or procedure with respect to voting" without first sub-
jecting the new procedure to federal scrutiny.3" This provision, how-
ever, applies only to those "covered" jurisdictions that have a history
of discriminatory voting practices.
3 5
The "extraordinary remedy"36 of preclearance requires a govern-
mental entity proposing a change to either (1) seek a declaratory judg-
ment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
that the change complies with the Act, or (2) submit the change to the
U.S. Attorney General for determination of its validity.37 If the entity
fails to seek preclearance, a private litigant or the Attorney General
may challenge the change in a local federal district court before a
panel of three judges. The district court's jurisdiction is limited to
deciding whether the change involves a practice with respect to voting,
and whether the change was precleared. 8 If the district court deter-
mines that the change was within the scope of section 5 and was not
accordingly submitted for preclearance, the governmental entity must
submit the change to the scrutiny of either the Attorney General or
the D.C. District Court.39 If the D.C. District Court issues a declara-
tory judgment that the practice is not discriminatory, or the Attorney
General fails to object to the practice within sixty days, the govern-
mental entity can legally implement the procedure.' Litigants may
only appeal these decisions directly to the Supreme Court.41
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
34. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-100, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1988)). [hereinafter referred to as section 5].
35. Section 4(b) defines covered jurisdictions as those that maintained a prohibited test or
device and had voter turnout of less than 50% of its voting age population in the 1964, 1968, and
1972 presidential elections. Id. § 4(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)).
36. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 (1977).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
38. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). This Note discusses only whether a
change is subject to preclearance under § 5, not whether a change has been found discriminatory
by preclearance.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
40. Neither a declaratory judgment nor the Attorney General's failure to object bars a
subsequent challenge to enjoin the practice. Id.
41. Id.
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C. Judicial Interpretation of Section 5: Allen and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court first enunciated the scope of section 5 in Allen v.
State Board of Elections.42 Allen was a consolidation of four cases,43
each alleging that a particular practice required preclearance under
section 5. The Court interpreted the Act broadly, declaring that Con-
gress designed the Act to reach any state enactment that had even a
minor impact on the election process." Relying on the statutory defi-
nition of voting, "all action necessary to make a vote effective,"' 45 the
Court examined the effect of the practices at issue. The four chal-
lenged practices required preclearance because they either affected the
ability to cast a ballot or diminished the meaningfulness of a vote.
Thus, the Court held that section 5 applied to write-in ballot require-
ments,4 candidate qualifications,47 at-large voting schemes,48 and
rules changing elective offices to appointed ones.49
In Perkins v. Matthews,5" the Supreme Court confirmed Allen's
broad interpretation of the Act and applied section 5 to changes in
polling place locations and municipal boundaries. The Court inquired
into both the purpose and effect of the challenged practice,51 and
applied section 5 not only to practices having an obvious effect on vot-
42. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
43. Bunton v. Patterson, 281 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss. 1967); Fairley v. Patterson, 282 F.
Supp. 164 (S.D. Miss. 1967), Whitley v. Williams, 296 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1967); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 268 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Va. 1967).
44. Allen, 393 U.S. at 566.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1971e (1988).
46. The write-in procedures in Allen required voters who wished to cast write-in votes to do
so in their own handwriting. The Court found that the write-in procedures were a voting practice
subject to preclearance because they barred illiterate citizens from voting for the candidate of
their choice. Allen, 393 U.S. at 570.
47. The challenged candidate requirements prevented a person who voted in the primary
from running as an independent candidate on the general election ballot. The Court found the
candidate requirement made it difficult for an independent candidate to gain a position on the
ballot, thereby undermining the effectiveness of voters wishing to elect independent candidates.
Moreover, because the requirement forced potential independent candidates to forego their right
to vote in the primary, the Court found it was a voting practice with "substantial impact." Id.
48. The challenged at-large scheme required voters from an entire county to elect a board,
whereas previously, voters from individual districts elected a representative member of the board.
The Court found that the challenged at-large scheme diluted the effect of minority votes. The
scheme made it more difficult for majority black districts to elect representatives because they
remained a minority county-wide. Id. at 569-70.
49. The Court required preclearance of a change from elective to appointed office because it
affected the power of a citizen's vote; when the office became appointive, it was no longer subject
to the voters' approval. Id.
50. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).




ing, but also to those having "a potential for discrimination."52  The
Court then held that changes in polling place locations required
preclearance because such changes had obvious effects on citizens'
ability to vote. 3 The Court further held that changes to municipal
boundaries that annexed majority black districts required pre-
clearance,5" because by enlarging the district to include a substantial
white electorate, the boundary changes had the potential to dilute
black voting strength.5
After Perkins, the realm of voting practices subject to section 5
expanded. Subsequent decisions applying the "potential for discrimi-
nation" test found that reapportionment and redistricting plans,56
changes in candidate filing dates and election dates, 7 numbered posts
and staggered terms, 58 changes in an elective office,59 and school board
52. Id. at 389. In explaining why § 5 applied to practices having a potential for
discrimination, the Court recognized that the district court was limited to deciding only the
applicability of § 5, not whether a practice was in fact discriminatory. Nonetheless the Court
cautioned against a district court "closing its eyes" to the Act's purpose which is to prevent any
practices that have the potential to abridge the right to vote because of race or color. Id at
384-85.
53. Id at 387 ("Even without going beyond the plain words of the statute, we think it clear
that the location of polling places constitutes a 'standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting.' . . . The accessibility, prominence, facilities, and prior notice of the polling place's
location all have an effect on a person's ability to exercise his franchise.").
54. Id. at 388-89
55. Id
56. The Court held a reapportionment plan that reorganized voting districts was subject to
§ 5 because it had effects similar to at-large schemes that dilute minority voting strength. Georgia
v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1973).
57. In NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, the Court applied § 5 to candidate filing
dates scheduled a year in advance of the election and to an election date scheduled in March
instead of November. Because the filing period occurred during a time when the Attorney
General had an outstanding objection to the new election plan, those who wanted to wait for the
Attorney General's decision were prevented from entering the race as latecomers. Additionally,
the change of the election to March was likely to result in lower voter turnout than would
holding the election simultaneously with the general election in November. NAACP v. Hampton
County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1985).
58. Under a numbered post system, posts (seats) are designated by number and candidates
must run for a specific seat; in contrast, under an open system all candidates run for all the seats,
with the candidates gaining the most votes filling the positions. This system was challenged in
City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 127-30 (1983), which also involved the use of
staggered terms. The challenged election plan required the mayor and two councilmen to be
elected on even-numbered years for two terms; the other councilmen were elected on odd-
numbered years for two terms. The Court found the combination of the numbered post and
staggered term system and the addition of seats to a governing body warranted preclearance
because the scheme tended to curb minorities' ability to elect minority candidates. See id. at
130-32.
59. An increase in the number of council members required preclearance because by altering
the nature of the seats at issue, this change affected minority candidate strength. See Lockhart,
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rules regarding employee-candidates,' all warranted preclearance
under section 5. In deciding whether a practice had the potential for
discrimination, the Court often considered the context of the change.
For example, in Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v. White, the
Court noted that the circumstances surrounding adoption of a practice
and the effect on the political process, need only suggest the potential
for discrimination to warrant preclearance.61
D. Preclearance Effectively Serves the Act's Objectives
Preclearance remains an effective tool to scrutinize and invalidate
practices that seek to hinder minority enfranchisement.62 When Con-
gress amended the Voting Rights Act,63 it commended the success of
section 5.64 Congress evaluated the Act's progress in increasing regis-
tration and voting rates for minorities, 65 and concluded that the Act
provided an effective mechanism for protecting voting rights.6 6 Con-
gress attributed the Act's success to its broad coverage and endorsed
the Allen and Perkins interpretations of the Act's broad scope.67 Con-
gress also emphasized the continued need for preclearance. Particu-
larly, Congress noted that as minority registration and voting increase,
innovative approaches negatively affecting minority participation
emerge. 68  Preclearance was therefore necessary to preserve the "frag-
ile gains" advanced thus far.69
460 U.S. at 131; see also Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990, 995 (D.D.C. 1978)
(changing office from appointive to elective had the potential to deny or dilute voting rights).
60. The Court held that a school board rule requiring its employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence while campaigning for elective office required preclearance because (1) it was enacted
shortly after the first black person in recent years sought election in that county, and (2) it
imposed economic disincentives on employees to enter into campaigns. Dougherty County, Ga.,
Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 40, 42 (1978).
61. Id. at 42.
62. H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 21, at 7.
63. See supra note 26 (discussing amendments).
64. H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 21, at 7.
65. Prior to 1965, only 29% of eligible black voters registered; by 1982 over 50% were
registered. Id.
66. Id.
67. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774,
782.
68. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 782;
H.R. REP. No. 397, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277, 3283
(1970).




E. Presley v. Etowah County Commission: One Step Backwards
Courts continued to read the Act broadly, thus bringing about a
gradual, but steady reduction in discriminatory voting practices.70 In
Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 71 however, the Supreme Court
severely restricted the scope of section 5. Presley involved resolutions
passed by two different Alabama county commissions. Both commis-
sions changed the decision-making authority of its elected members.72
Consequently, newly elected black members brought suit alleging that
the county commissions violated section 5 by failing to submit these
changes for preclearance. The Court refused to apply section 5, hold-
ing that section 5 applies only to practices that fall into one of four
categories of previously covered voting practices.73
The Russell County Commission originally had three commission-
ers, who were elected at-large.74 Although major funding decisions
required the approval of the entire commission, each commissioner
had individual authority over routine repair and maintenance expendi-
tures in particular districts.75 Between 1972 and 1985, federal court
orders and consent decrees ultimately enlarged the Commission to
seven members,7 creating four new districts and abolishing the poten-
tially discriminatory at-large voting scheme.77 Following the 1979
decree, the Commission passed a resolution abolishing the individual
road districts. Under this new "Unit System" the county engineer, an
appointed official, assumed primary responsibility for road opera-
tions.78 Consequently, the commissioners no longer had any decision-
making authority. The first black commissioners were elected in
1986. 79
The Etowah County Commission originally had four seats, elected
at-large, representing residency districts. The Commission voted col-
lectively on the division of funds for road construction, maintenance
and repairs, but the commissioners had individual control over spend-
ing within their respective districts.8 0 Because the at-large voting
70. See supra note 65; see also S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 13 (1975), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 779.
71. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
72. Id. at 825-29.
73. Id. at 832.
74. Id. at 826.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 48 (discussing discriminatory at-large schemes).
78. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 826.
79. Id. at 827.
80. Id. at 825.
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scheme had potentially discriminatory effects,81 in 1986, a federal dis-
trict court panel of three judges issued a consent decree adding two
new districts.82 The decree also restructured the election process so
that voters elected commissioners on a district basis.
Following the decree, two new members, one of whom was black,
took office.83 The four white commissioners, elected before the decree,
remained on the Commission. The four holdover members passed a
"Road Supervision Resolution" that retained the hold-overs' author-
ity, but stripped the new members of all power.8 4 Additionally, the
holdover commissioners passed a "Common Fund Resolution," pro-
viding for county-wide use of funds.85 This second resolution abol-
ished the prior practice of dividing the funds among the districts for
distribution according to each commissioner's discretion.
86
The aggrieved black commissioners of the Russell and Etowah
County Commissions together challenged the resolutions before a
three-judge panel in the Alabama Federal District Court. The district
court held that neither the Unit System nor the Common Fund Reso-
lution required section 5 preclearance because the Common Fund
Resolution did not significantly change government officials' power
and the Unit System did not transfer power among elected officials.8 7
The black commissioners appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
88
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision, but on dif-
ferent grounds. The Court first emphasized the limited scope of the
Act: only changes in voting require preclearance. The Court then
adopted a new category-based approach to define "voting practices"
subject to section 5.89 The Court examined the facts of previous cases
81. See Brief of Appellants, Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) (Nos.
90-711, 90-712), available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
82. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 825.
83. Id.
84. The resolution authorized collective decision-making by the commission on road
operations and passed by a 4-2 vote, with the new members dissenting. Id.
85. Id. at 825-26.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 827. Although the district court found the Road Supervision Resolution subject to
preclearance, the Supreme Court did not address this practice because no appeal was taken.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988); see supra text accompanying note 41.
89. In addition to changing previous interpretation of § 5's coverage, the Presley decision
minimized the amount of deference given to the Attorney General's construction of § 5. Relying
on its definition of covered practices as "any change affecting voting, even though it appears to be
minor or indirect .... 28 C.F.R. § 51.12 (1991), the Attorney General fied an amicus brief in
support of appellants. Although precedent reveals that the Court has consistently afforded the
Attorney General's constrnction of the Act considerable deference, the Presley majority declined




and identified four categories of voting practices:9' (1) practices
involving the manner of voting, (2) candidacy requirements, (3) prac-
tices effecting the composition of the electorate, and (4) practices cre-
ating or abolishing an elective office.91 The Court then held that the
Common Fund Resolution and the Unit System were not voting prac-
tices because they did not fall within any of the categories.92
The Court expressed concern over the ramifications of an overly
broad reading of the Act. The Court was particularly troubled that a
broad construction would blur the distinction between changes in vot-
ing rules and routine changes in government organization and func-
tions.93 Broadly construing the Act would involve subjecting more
state actions to preclearance, resulting in interference with state gov-
ernment and independence. 94 Thus, in order to preserve state auton-
omy, the Court determined that only rules governing how one gains
office should require preclearance; it did not want to tamper with
those government decisions that involve independent actions taken by
officials once they gain office. If courts do not carefully confine the
scope of section 5 coverage, the Court reasoned, ultimately any gov-
ernment action would require preclearance. 95
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, argued in
dissent that precedent mandates preclearance of these changes. Justice
Stevens noted agreement among federal courts that transfers of deci-
sion-making power having a potential for discrimination warranted
preclearance. 96 Moreover, several Department of Justice decisions
refused to preclear changes in the power of elected officials because the
changes had a potentially discriminatory impact on minority voters.9 7
Justice Stevens noted that in order to achieve the Act's purpose-
eradication of racial discrimination in the voting process98 -section 5
should be given "the broadest possible scope." 99 Justice Stevens
argued that the majority decision effectively limited the scope of vot-
90. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 828 ("We agree that all changes in voting must be precleared and
with Allen's holding that the scope of § 5 is expansive within its sphere of operation. That sphere
comprehends all changes to rules governing voting, changes effected through any of the
mechanisms described in the statute. Those mechanisms are any 'qualification or prerequisite' or
any 'standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting.' ").
91. Id.
92. Id. at 829-31.
93. Id. at 829.
94. See id.
95. Id. (according to the Court "every decision taken by government implicates voting").
96. Id. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 833 n.3.




ing practices to four exclusive categories, 1" although the majority
purported to do otherwise."0
Finally, Justice Stevens found significant the timing of the commis-
sions' actions. Particularly, he noted that the Etowah Commission
adopted the Common Fund Resolution shortly after election of the
first black commissioner. Thus, he concluded, the resolution was an
obvious response to the redistricting that made these seats accessible
to blacks."02 At the very least, Justice Stevens would have held that
the circumstances surrounding implementation warranted pre-
clearance of the resolution.
10 3
II. PRESLEY VIOLATES THE SPIRIT AND THE RULE OF
SECTION 5
The Presley Court improperly excluded the Common Fund Resolu-
tion and the Unit System from section 5 coverage for several reasons.
First, by adopting a new definition of voting practices, the Court
ignored precedent. Second, the Court created a narrow and inflexible
test that conflicts with the objectives of the Voting Rights Act.
Finally, the Court misapplied its own test by failing to recognize that
the Common Fund Resolution and Unit System effectively abolish an
elective office and therefore satisfy the Court's fourth category of vot-
ing practices. Thus, the Presley decision provides an unworkable test
and an unsatisfactory result.
A. The Presley Court Ignored Precedent
The Presley Court's four category analysis created a superficial defi-
nition of voting practices that fails to consider the potentially discrimi-
natory effects of a challenged practice. The Court ignored previous
interpretations of section 5 by creating a presumption that all practices
requiring preclearance constitute practices inherently related to vot-
ing. Previously, courts applied section 5 to practices having a poten-
tial for discrimination as well as those having an obvious effect on
voting."° If the challenged practice did not directly affect the way in
which people voted, courts inquired further to determine if the prac-
100. Id. at 836 n.13.
101. Id. at 828 ("Without implying that the four typologies exhaust the statute's coverage, we
can say these later cases fall within one of the four factual contexts presented in the Allen
cases.").
102. Id. at 838.
103. Id. at 839.




tice had a potential for discrimination."' 5 In Presley, however, the
Court limited its inquiry to whether the challenged practice bore some
resemblance to practices previously held subject to section 5
preclearance.
The Court in fact created a presumption that if a challenged prac-
tice did not fall within one of the four newly defined categories, the
practice was not related to voting. 6 Although refusing to acknowl-
edge the impact of its actions,10 7 the Court rendered its categories
exclusive: it held that the Common Fund Resolution and the Unit
System did not constitute voting practices subject to section 5 because
they did not fit into one of the four categories. 10 8 Thus, contrary to
precedent, the Presley Court only looked superficially at whether the
challenged action fit into one of the four categories, without evaluating
the actual effects the actions had on the ability of minorities to partici-
pate in the political process.
B. The Presley Test Is Flawed
The Presley analysis provides an unworkable approach to determin-
ing coverage under section 5 for two reasons. First, by formulating
four exclusive categories of voting practices, the Court impermissibly
narrowed the scope of section 5. Second, the Court's new test also
proves inflexible because it fails to consider innovative means of deny-
ing minorities the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the polit-
ical process.
1. The Presley Test Narrows the Scope of Section 5
Presley narrowed the scope of section 5 by limiting its coverage to
four discrete categories of voting practices. Under Presley, section 5
may no longer apply to actions that previously qualified as voting
practices-actions that had a potential for discrimination, but did not
relate directly to voting. For example, like the challenged practices in
Presley, transfers of decision-making authority among elected officials
that have the potential to diminish the power of a vote 0 9 will escape
105. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973) ('[S]ection 5 is not concerned
with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but rather with the reality of changed practices as
they affect Negro voters."); supra notes 50-57.
106. See Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
107. Id. at 828; see supra note 101.
108. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
109. Similar transfers of authority have previously required preclearance. See, eg., Presley,
112 S. Ct. at 833 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D.
Ala. 1985) (reallocation of governmental powers); Robinson v. Alabama State Dep't of Educ.,
652 F. Supp. 484 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (transfer of authority from elected board of education to
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coverage. Even though such practices have potentially discriminatory
effects on minority voters, they will not require preclearance because
they do not fit neatly into any of the Court's categories of voting prac-
tices. Thus, Presley excludes from the scope of section 5 voting prac-
tices previously held subject to preclearance.
The Presley Court's narrow definition of voting practices also con-
flicts with legislative intent. Congress intended section 5 to have the
broadest scope possible.110 Section 5 preclearance remains the only
viable method of screening out discriminatory practices; previously
adopted anti-discriminatory measures have proven inadequate.111
Thus, Congress drafted the Voting Rights Act broadly to ensure that
courts erred on the side of overinclusiveness when determining
whether a given practice requires scrutiny.
1 1 2
Although the Presley Court argued that overinclusiveness would
result in subjecting routine practices to unnecessary preclearance,'
13
overinclusiveness serves the ends of section 5 and effectuates legislative
intent. The courts must first scrutinize all practices affecting voting in
order to identify those practices that violate the Act. Without the
threshold inquiry of preclearance, discriminatory practices will go
unchecked. Thus, even seemingly ministerial practices,1 14 and prac-
tices that may not meet with objection by the Attorney General or the
federal courts, require preclearance. ' 1 5 By restricting the scope of sec-
tion 5, however, the Presley Court limits the opportunities of discrimi-
nation victims to obtain recourse, defeating the central purpose of the
Act. Although a somewhat "severe measure,"' 1 6  preclearance
remains instrumental in furthering the Act's objectives; by placing the
appointed county council); County Council of Sumter County v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694
(D.D.C. 1983) (transfer of power from governor and general assembly to a county council elected
at large); Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978) (discussed supra note
59)). Because changes affecting minority elected representatives' authority and power minimize,
reallocate, or submerge these representatives' authority, they hay the potential to dilute
minority voting strength. Therefore, they have the potential to discriminate and should be
subject to § 5 scrutiny. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality,
77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 1504-05 (1991).
110. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
111. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
112. S. REP. No. 295, supra note 67, at 15-16, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781-82.
113. See Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 829; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
114. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1985) (even
seemingly "ministerial" practices that had potential for discrimination required preclearance "in
light of the sweeping objectives of the Act").
115. During debate over the 1982 amendments, Congress rejected a proposal to limit § 5 to
cover only those changes producing the most objection from the Attorney General. H. REP. No.
227, supra note 21, at 34-35.




burden on the governing entity, Congress sought through section 5 to
"shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the
evil to its victims."
117
2. Presley Creates an Inflexible Approach to Section 5
The Presley test proves inflexible because it considers only past
behavior and does not contemplate future innovative means of dis-
crimination. The Presley Court's approach inverts the definition of
voting practices. Previous cases compared the statutory definition...
with the facts at issue to determine whether a challenged action consti-
tuted a voting practice. 1 9 The Presley Court, however, compared the
facts of previous cases with the facts before the Court.1 20 The Court
would require preclearance only if the challenged practice was factu-
ally identical to a practice previously held subject to scrutiny.
The Presley Court thus created a paradox whereby an innovative
means of discriminating does not require preclearance by virtue of its
previous nonexistence. Presley's paradox frustrates the objectives of
section 5. Section 5 sought to identify and eliminate all discriminatory
practices, and to ensure that new devices did not replace the old
ones.121 If the Court confines coverage to past practices, however,
new discriminatory practices will never be identified. Thus, Presley's
four-category test, overemphasizing methods previously held subject
to section 5, undermines the central purpose of the Voting Rights Act:
to scrutinize innovative voting schemes and thereby prevent the
entrenchment of discriminatory practices.
C. The Presley Court Misapplied its New Test
The Presley Court held that the challenged resolutions did not fall
within its fourth category, "abolition of an elective office." '22 The
Court rejected the argument that the resolutions rendered votes for the
117. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 393 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
118. Section 6 defines voting as "all action necessary to make a vote effective." Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-100, § 6, 79 Stat. 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971c (1988)).
119. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
121. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
182-83; see also H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 21, at 4 ("Through this remedy the Congress
intended to provide an expeditious and effective review which would assure that practices or
procedures other than those directly addressed in the legislation ... would not be used to thwart
the will of the Congress finally to secure the franchise for blacks.").
122. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 828 (1992).
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commissioners ineffective, 23 but failed to explain its analysis.124
Instead, the Court concluded that the Common Fund Resolution and
the Unit System did not constitute changes abolishing elective office
because the office still existed.
125
Contrary to the Presley Court's holding, the challenged practices in
Presley effectively abolished an elective office. By requiring the major-
ity of the Commission to make decisions for all the districts, the Com-
mon Fund Resolution abolished the individual district commissioners'
positions as autonomous decision-makers. Similarly, the Unit Sys-
tem's transfer of power to the engineer effectively abolished the com-
missioners' positions because it stripped them of their only substantial
decision-making authority. Therefore, because they rendered the
commissioners powerless, the resolutions abolished positions of
authority and satisfy the Court's fourth category of covered practices.
Although the Court found it significant that the electorate could
technically still vote for the office, 126 the Court ignored the reality that
voters could no longer cast a ballot for a politically empowered deci-
sion-maker. Mere existence of an elective office dces not confer polit-
ical empowerment upon an electorate. Voting for elective office is only
meaningful when the elected official retains decision-making authority.
As in Presley, voting for a powerless position is comparable to not
voting for the position at all. The Court's argument therefore lacks
merit.
Both the Common Fund Resolution and the Unit System are also
comparable to previously covered practices that created or abolished
elective office. As early as Allen, the Court held that section 5 applies
to rules regarding changes in elective office. In Bunton v. Patterson, 27
a companion case to Allen, the Court found a change warranted
preclearance because it eliminated a position formerly answerable to
the electorate. 128  The Presley facts involved analogous changes.
Because the resolutions transformed the commissioners into virtual
figureheads, the commissioners no longer had authority to respond to
or represent the electorate. The resolutions therefore warranted
123. The government argued that a vote for an official with less authority has diminished
value. Id. at 829.
124. The Court simply concluded that the practice "has no bearing on the substance of voting
power for it does not increase or diminish the number of officials for whom the electorate may
vote." Id.
125. Id. at 830.
126. Id. at 829-30.
127. 281 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss. 1967), rev'd, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
569-70 (1969).




preclearance because they prevented elected officials from meaning-
fully representing their voter constituencies. Thus, the Common Fund
Resolution and the Unit System constitute voting practices under sec-
tion 5. By nullifying elected officials' decision-making authority, these
changes effectively abolished elective office. Therefore, applying the
Presley test, these practices fall under category four and warranted
preclearance.
D. Presley Encourages 'Lawful Discrimination'
The Presley decision encourages governing entities to discriminate
against minorities once they gain elective office, holding that a practice
abrogating an elected official's power does not affect voting as long as
the elected position remains intact. As long as voters still have a voice
in who fills the office, governing entities may escape preclearance.
They need only transfer the office's previously held powers to an
appointed official and thereby render a newly-elected minority a mere
figurehead. Governing bodies eager to restrict minority participation
in the political process can now retract a minority elected official's
power. By its holding in Presley, the Court has created a rule that
allows governing entities to lawfully implement discriminatory prac-
tices once minorities gain elective office, repeating a defiance of the
Fifteenth Amendment that precipitated the initial passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. 129
III. REFORMULATING THE PRESLEY TEST AND
REDEFINING VOTING PRACTICES
To avoid the result reached in Presley, courts should incorporate
another step into the test for determining whether section 5 applies.
The Court should require preclearance of those practices that do not
fit into one of the four categories, but the implementation of which
nonetheless raises an inference of discriminatory intent. Additionally,
Congress should amend the Voting Rights Act to clarify the scope of
section 5.
A. An Inquiry into Discriminatory Motive
The Supreme Court should adopt a two-pronged approach to deter-
mining whether a challenged action requires preclearance. Specifi-
cally, district courts must first ask whether the practice fits into one of
the four categories enunciated in Presley. If the court finds that the
129. See supra notes 14-16 (describing ways by which resistors to black enfranchisement
circumvented the Constitution and discriminated).
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challenged action does not resemble any of the categorized practices,
the inquiry should not stop there. The court should also examine all
the circumstances surrounding the implementation of the challenged
practice and should determine whether the circumstances raise an
inference of intent to discriminate.1 30 To answer this inquiry, a court
should consider, for example, the governing entity's historical discrim-
ination and the timing of the governing entity's implementation of the
challenged practice. 131
Courts should probe the governing entity's history of discrimination
by examining various factors. Some relevant factors would include
previous objections by the Attorney General, court orders or consent
decrees that required the jurisdiction to restructure its election pro-
cess, and the number of minority candidates and elected officials in the
jurisdiction. For example, in Presley, both county commissions
restructured the commissions and election schemes pursuant to con-
sent decrees and court orders, and previously had no black members
on the commission.
13 2
Courts should also examine the timing of the practice's implementa-
tion. In particular, courts should consider the timing of the action
relative to the holding of elections and the issuance of judicial man-
dates to remedy existing discrimination. For example, in Presley, the
resolutions were passed close to elections, 33 after court orders and
consent decrees, 13  and after minorities were elected to offices domi-
nated by whites.1 35 Together, these factors suggested that the chal-
lenged practices were adopted with a discriminatory motive.
13 6
Forced to open the process to minorities, the all-white commissions
sought to prohibit minority officials from exercising any significant
decision-making authority. Had the Court applied the proposed test
and critically examined the timing of the resolutions' passage and the
130. An "intent to discriminate" occurs when an entity implementing a change intended to
render a vote meaningless or exclude minorities from the political process.
131. This test incorporates Justice Stevens' preferred holding of Presley. See Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 839 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 825-26.
133. The Etowah County Commission passed the Common Fund Resolution immediately
after the first black commissioner's election. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text; see
also supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v.
White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978)).
134. Both the Etowah and Russell County Commissions passed challenged resolutions after
court orders and consent decrees required restructuring of the commissions. See supra notes
68-80.
135. Prior to passage of the challenged resolutions, neither the Etowah nor Russell County
Commissions included a black member. See supra notes 79, 83.




context in which the entities operated, the county commissions in
Presley would not have escaped scrutiny.
This proposed test would also address the Court's concern that a
broad reading of section 5 would require unnecessary preclearance of
every government decision, constituting undue interference in the
internal operations of state and local governments. 131 Justice Ken-
nedy expressed a particular concern that every budget passed by a gov-
erning entity would require preclearance. 138 By requiring some
evidence of discriminatory intent, however, courts would not subject
every government action to preclearance; only those in which the gov-
ernment intended to exclude minorities would undergo preclearance.
B. Defining Voting Practices Under Section 5
Given the Court's reluctance to apply section 5 broadly, Congress
should amend the statute to make clear the scope of section 5 and
ensure its effectiveness. Previously, the Court has broadly interpreted
the statutory language, practices "with respect to voting," 139 to
encompass a variety of challenged actions."4 The Presley Court, how-
ever, chose to interpret this language very narrowly, by confining cov-
erage to practices directly related to voting. Congress should amend
this language to clarify the scope of section of 5.
Specifically, Congress should reword section 5 to include "practices
affecting voting strength or the value of a vote," and "practices affect-
ing participation in the electoral process." The language, "practices
affecting voting strength and the value of a vote," embodies the
Court's previous interpretation of the scope of voting practices cov-
ered under section 5. The Court has continually applied section 5 to
actions that had the potential to dilute minority votes or diminish
minority voting strength.141 Likewise, the language, "practices affect-
ing participation in the electoral process," accurately characterizes
practices the Court previously subjected to section 5 preclearance:
actions that affected a person's ability to vote or run for office and
previously required preclearance. 142 Thus, this proposed language
would reinstate the Court's previous application of section 5.
137. Id. at 830-31.
138. Id. at 830.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
140. See supra notes 44-60.
141. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing Dougherty Bd. of Educ. v. White,
439 U.S. 32 (1978)).
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Moreover, this language comports with legislative intent by provid-
ing a broader concept of voting practices. This language provides
broader coverage because it considers not only practices involving
superficial participation as a voter, but also considers practices that
affect the ability to meaningfully participate in the political process.
Congress intended that the Act have the broadest reach possible.
Although initially focused on removing barriers to registration and
voting, Congress also designed the Act to eliminate "continuing dis-
crinination."' 43 Applying section 5 with this proposed language
would address such practices. Under this new definition of voting
practices, section 5 would encompass those actions that interfere with
minorities' right to vote not only at the ballot box, but also those
actions that have the potential to devalue a vote, thereby interfering
with the elective office gained by that vote.
Finally, this proposed language would address transfers of decision-
making authority like those involved in Presley. Because the elected
officials no longer have the power to respond to their minority constit-
uents and participate in decision-making, the challenged practices in
Presley diminish the value of minority votes, denying minorities mean-
ingful representation and participation in the political process. T4
Thus, unlike Presley's literal reading of practices "with respect to vot-
ing," applying section 5 to "all practices affecting voting strength"
scrutinizes potentially discriminatory transfers of power among
elected officials.
Congress must amend section 5 to avoid the undesirable effects of a
literal reading of practices "with respect to voting." Changing the lan-
guage to include all actions "affecting voting strength" or "participa-
tion in the electoral process" would provide a more definitive scope to
section 5. Moreover, the proposed language is consistent with prece-
dent and effectively furthers the Act's objectives.
143. Congress sought through the Voting Rights Act
to create a set of mechanisms for dealing with continuing voting discrimination, not just step
by step, but comprehensively and finally .... As senator Javits put it, the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act was "not only to correct an active history of discrimination, the denying
of Negroes of their right to register and vote, but also to deal vith the accumulation of
discrimination .... The bill would attempt to do something about accumulated wrongs and
the continuance of the wrongs."
S. REP. No. 417, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181-82.






The Presley decision created a narrow, inflexible test for determin-
ing section 5 applicability. By confining the scope of section 5 to four
exclusive categories of voting practices, the Court's new test excludes
from coverage potentially discriminatory changes in the power struc-
ture of elective office. In order to effectively further the goal of the
Voting Rights Act to protect and secure minorities' right to vote,
courts should also inquire into whether a challenged practice was
implemented with a discriminatory motive. Additionally, Congress
should amend section 5's language to provide a broader concept of
"voting rights."
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